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Export Group v. Reef Industries, Inc.: The Reconciliation of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
I. Introduction
Th[e] perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and
[the] common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an
interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of
cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a
part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been
stated to be the attribute of every nation)
- ChiefJustice John Marshall
Since its inception, the principle of sovereign immunity has been
a confusing and poorly drafted area of American law. For decades,
American courts were reluctant to exercise jurisdiction over foreign
states, instead deferring to the recommendations of the State Depart-
ment on sovereign immunity issues.' This reluctance made the
granting of sovereign immunity a political choice rather than ajudicial
exercise.3 However, in 1976, Congress dramatically changed the
United States' approach to sovereign immunity by enacting the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).'
In the twenty years since the FSIA became law, courts have
struggled to interpret the nebulous language of the statute, with
varying degrees of success. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals attempted to explain the language and scope of the statute in
Export Group v. Reef Industries, Inc.5 The main issue before the court
in Export Group was whether the commercial activity exception to
sovereign immunity under the FSIA includes tortious activities for
which immunity is retained under section 1605(a) (5) (B) when foreign
states act in their noncommercial, sovereign capacity.6 The Ninth
Circuit held that the commercial activity exception does include
tortious activities, so long as these activities are not performed by a
I The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
2 See Stella Havkin, Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The Relationship Between
the Commercial Activity Exception and the Noncommercial Tort Exception in Light of De Sanchez v.
Banco Central de Nicaragua, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 455, 461-62
(1987) [hereinafter Havkin].
3 See infra notes 60-84 and accompanying text.
4 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2-4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976).
5 54 F.3d 1466 (9th Cir. 1995).
6 Id. at 1471. The commercial activity exception is one of the exceptions to immunity
of foreign states to suit in American courts. See 28 U.S.C. §1605(a) (2) (1976); Havkin, supra
note 2, at 463.
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foreign entity acting in its sovereign capacity.7
The Ninth Circuit's decision is significant for two reasons. First,
it is one of the initial instances in which a court has attempted to
reconcile the inconsistencies presented when comparing the "commer-
cial activity exception" to immunity, section 1605(a) (2) of the FSIA,
with the "noncommercial torts exception" of immunity, section
1605(a) (5) of the Act.' Furthermore, it provides an opportunity for
the Supreme Court to finally clarify the language of the Act, particular-
ly the exceptions to immunity found in sections 1605 through 1607.
This Note will examine the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 and the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of this Act. First, the Note
will discuss the facts, procedural history and holding of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Export Group v. Reef Industries, Inc.'°
Second, the Note will examine the confusing history of the FSIA,
including the various interpretations the courts have given to the
commercial activity exception. 1 Third, the Note will attempt to
analyze the Ninth Circuit's decision in light of the background of the
FSIA. It will examine whether the Ninth Circuit's understanding of the
FSIA's exceptions to immunity is correct, as well as the logic of the
court's reasoning." Finally, the Note will conclude that the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of the FSIA is proper and will discuss the
ramifications of this interpretation for international relations and
global unity."i
H. Statement of the Case
A. The Facts
The Export Group, a general partnership engaged in international
7 Export Group v. Reef Industries, Inc., 54 F.3d at 1477 (holding that section
1605(a)(5)(B) does not restore immunity to a foreign sovereign who has committed a
commercial activity, but that section 1605(a) (5) (B) applies only to noncommercial torts).
8 Few courts have wrestled with the issue of whether the restrictions found in section
1605(a) (5) (B) of the Act actually restrict the scope of the commercial activity exception in
subsection 1605(a)(2). See United Euram v. U.S.S.R., 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (the
noncommercial torts exception in no way interferes with or restricts the commercial activity
exception, section 1605(a) (2)); see alsoYessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp.
849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (the commercial activity exception and the noncommercial torts excep-
tion should be construed sequentially).
9 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607 (1976). The interpretations of the noncommercial tort and
the commercial activity exceptions are imbued with confusion and inconsistency, which seems
to come largely from the broad phrasing of the exceptions and the vague wording of the
FSIA. Havkin, supra note 2, at 493.
10 See infra notes 15-59 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 60-145 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 146-84 and accompanying text.
13 See infra Part V.
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trade, 4 reached an agreement with a commercial supplier, Reef
Industries (Reef), whereby The Export Group would serve as Reefs
exclusive representative in bidding on a contract from a Mexican
government agency, Almacenes Nacionales. De Desposito, S.A.
(ANDSA), for four hundred tarpaulins to cover grain storage bins.'5
While this bid by The Export Group was under consideration by
ANDSA, a corrupt ANDSA employee divulged the details of the bid to
the international director of Instituto Mexicano del Cafe
(INMECAFE),16 as part of an alleged conspiracy to prepare a compet-
ing bid on the contract. 7 INMECAFE then submitted a bid to sell
Reef tarps to ANDSA under another company name, NEUERO. 8
The result of this competing bid was that ANDSA awarded the contract
to NEUERO, and The Export Group suffered a loss of approximately
two million dollars in profits anticipated from its exclusive representa-
tion agreement with Reef.'9
B. Procedural History
The Export Group filed suit against NEUERO and Reef in Orange
County Superior Court on June 24, 1983.20 Asserting diversity
jurisdiction, the defendants removed the case to the district court for
the Central District of California.2 On November 19, 1984, The
Export- Group amended its complaint to add as defendants
INMECAFE, ANDSA, and the international director of INMECAFE,
Javier Mora.2 2 The amended complaint alleged causes of action for
interference with prospective business advantage, interference with
business and contractual relations, negligent interference with
prospective business advantage, inducing breach of contract, and
conspiracy.
23
The defendants were personally served with the complaint and
failed to respond,24 prompting the district court judge to enter
14 The Export Group was formed to specialize in representing North American
companies on an exclusive basis in the sale of commercial and industrial products to agencies
of the Mexican Government. Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1468.
15 Id.
16 INMECAFE is a branch of the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture and Cattle, and is
short for Instituto Mexicano del Cafe (the Mexican Coffee Institute). Id.
17 Id.
8 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1468-69. The merits of the case have not yet been reached by the courts. At
the present time, only the jurisdictional question has been addressed. Id. at 1469.
24 Id. at 1469. One argument that has been made, that was not raised in this case, is
that a foreign country waives its immunity by not defending the claim. See 28 U.S.C.
§1605(a) (1) (1976) (the waiver exception to sovereign immunity). This argument has not
been kindly received in the past. See Frovola v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 378 (7th Cir. 1985)
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default judgments against them on May 22, 1985.25 On September 5,
1986, the Consul of the United Mexican States filed a motion on
behalf of INMECAFE to set aside the default judgment.26 The
motion was based on lack of personal service and lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, under the FSIA, over an instrumentality of the Mexican
Government. 27 The district court denied this motion on April 21,
1987.28
The Export Group settled its claims with all the defendants to the
suit, with the sole exception of INMECAFE. 9 Once the other
defendants were dismissed, the plaintiff applied for a defaultjudgment
against INMECAFE on May 5, 199130 This application was granted
by the district court, which awarded Export Group over two million
dollars in compensatory damages plus costs."' INMECAFE promptly
filed a motion to set aside the default judgment on the grounds that
the judgment was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct.3 2  In the alternative, INMECAFE argued that the judg-
ment was void because the district court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear the claim, pursuant to FSIA section
1605(a) (5) (B). After oral argument, the district court granted
INMECAFE's motion on the grounds that "the defaultjudgment is void
because the court lacks" subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claim
pursuant to the FSIA, section 1605(a) (5) (B). 4
In granting INMECAFE's motion to set aside the default judg-
ment, the district court ruled that the exceptions to the waiver of
(the argument that the U.S.S.R. implicitly waived its immunity by not defending this action
is without merit); see also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 n.20
(1983) (even in cases where the defendant has not entered an appearance, the district court
has an obligation to satisfy itself that the defense of sovereign immunity is not available
before it has subject-matter jurisdiction).
25 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1469.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. The motion to set aside the default judgment on the grounds of fraud,
misconduct or deceit is governed by FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).
33 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1469. Section 1605(a) (5) states in relevant part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case ... (5) not otherwise encompassed in
paragraph (2) above, in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
ersonal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United
tates and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any
official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office
or employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to ... (B) any claim arising
out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights.
28 U.S.C. §1605(a) (1976).
34 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1469.
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sovereign immunity contained in section 1605(a) (5) (B) were not
limited to the noncommercial torts exception recited in section
1605 (a) (5), but instead extended to restore sovereign immunity for any
such tort claims, even if committed in the course of a "commercial
activity," as defined in section 1603(a)(2) of the Act.35 Thus, even
though INMECAFE's acts that formed the basis of The Export Group's
complaint were deemed "commercial activities" falling under section
1605 (a) (2), the court ruled that it was entitled to sovereign immunity
under section 1605(a) (5) (B) of the FSIA. 6 The Export Group
appealed the district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 7
C. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by recognizing that the FSIA
provided the "sole basis" for federal jurisdiction over The Export
Group's claim of interference with the contract against INMECAFE. 8
The court noted that "the FSIA creates a statutory presumption that a
foreign state and its instrumentalities are immune from suit unless one
of the specific exceptions enumerated in section 1605 through 1607 of
the Act applies."39 After stating these rules of law, the court proceed-
ed to address the various contentions of The Export Group.
The court first considered the argument by The Export Group
that INMECAFE was not an "agency or instrumentality" of the Mexican
35 Id. at 1470. Section 1603(d) of the FSIA defines "commercial activity" as: "[E]ither
a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The
commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose."
28 U.S.C. §1603(d) (1976).
36 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1470.
37 Id. at 1469.
38 Id. (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,433-35
& n.3 (1989)). Section 1330 lists the jurisdictional requirements of the Act. Concerning
subject-matter jurisdiction, it provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section
1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the
foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-07 of this title
or under any applicable international agreement.
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
39 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1469. The statutory presumption of immunity is found in
section 1604 of the Act, which provides:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party
at the time of enactment of this Act. . . a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided
in sections 1605 through 1607 of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1, 12, (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. 6604, 6616 [hereinafter House Report] (stating that the FSIA
'.starts from a premise of immunity and then creates exceptions to the general principle").
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
government and thus did not deserve the presumption of immunity.!'
The court rejected this contention, reasoning that INMECAFE met its
burden of proving its entitlement to sovereign immunity4 by submit-
ting official Mexican government documents and a sworn affidavit of
INMECAFE's counsel that established INMECAFE as "a dependencyof
the [Mexican] Ministry of Agriculture and Cattle."42 In rejecting The
Export Group's argument, the court noted that "[t]his is a novel
position for Export Group to take on appeal, since it repeatedly and
consistently argued below that INMECAFE was 'an agency or represen-
tative of the Mexican Government."'43
The court next addressed The Export Group's, most forceful
contention: that the district court erred in ruling that the exceptions
to the waiver of sovereign immunity for noncommercial torts listed in
section 1605 (a) (5) (B) of the FSIA restrict the scope of the commercial
activity exception to immunity, found in section 1605(a) (2) of the
Act.44 In considering this issue, the court recognized that the district
court had relied heavily on a footnote in a prior Ninth Circuit
decision, Gregorian v. Izvestia,45 implying that the commercial activity
exception is subject to section 1605(a) (5) (B) of the Act. 6 Refusing
40 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1470. Agencies of a foreign government can be immune
from suit in the same manner that a foreign government itself can. The FSIA's definition
of "foreign state" includes "an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state ...." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(a) (1976).
41 Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which must be specially pleaded; thus
the burden of establishing applicability of immunity lies with the foreign. state. House
Report, supra note 39, at 6616; see also Olsen v. Gov't. of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.
1984) (cert. denied, 469 U.S. 917 (1984)).
42 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1470.
43 Id. The court addressed as a side matter Export Group's contention that it may
contest this issue on appeal because the court had recognized before that a plaintiff is not
limited to the statutory basis for subject matterjurisdiction stated in its complaint. Id.; see also
Gerritsen v. de la Madrid Hurtado, 819 F.2d 1511, 1515 (9th Cir. 1987) (a plaintiff is not
limited to the statutory basis of its complaint when attempting to raise an issue on appeal).
The court in Export Group ruled that Gerritsen does not apply because the Export Group was
attempting to plead facts different from those in their complaint, without explanation for
their failure to discover these facts earlier. Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1471; see also Int'l Union
of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985)
(stating that before this court will address such an issue "the proponent 'must' show
exceptional circumstances why the issue was not raised below").
44 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1471. The commercial activity exception provides, in relevant
part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case... (2) in which the action is based upon
a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon
an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
45 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1989).
46 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1471. The Gregorian footnote reads, in relevant part:
(C]ontrary to plaintiffs' contention, the bar against 'libel claims' contained in
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to acknowledge the Gregorian footnote as an alternative ground for the
decision, the court concluded that the footnote was dictum with "no
binding or precedential impact in the present case." 47  The court
supported this conclusion by observing that "no case in this circuit has
cited the contested footnote as binding precedent, and, in fact,
subsequent cases have contradicted its interpretation of section
1605."
48
After disposing of these preliminary issues, the court began to
interpret the FSIA, particularly the exceptions to sovereign immunity
embodied in sections 1605(a) (2) and, 1605(a)'(5) of the Act. It first
recognized the confusing nature of the language and structure of the
FSIA,49 but still attempted to ascertain the legislative purpose from
the ordinary meaning of the language.
The clear statutory language of section 1605(a) (5) indicates that both this
exception and the restrictions upon this exception are intended to apply
only to torts "not otherwise encompassed in [section 1605(a)(2)] ...."
Similarly, the phrase that establishes the two sets of restrictions on the
waiver of sovereign immunity established by section 1605(a) (5) (subsec-
tion (A) for discretionary functions and subsection (B) for enumerated
torts) states that in those cases "this paragraph shall not apply." Thus,
by its plain and unambiguous terms, section 1605(a) (5) limits the reach
of.those restrictions only to noncommercial torts. 50
The Ninth Circuit also considered the interpretations given to the
FSIA by other appellate and district courts. The court noted that the
district court in Gregorian is "the only court to rule that foreign states
and their agents are immune from claims for torts listed in section
1605(a) (5) (B) when those claims arise from the foreign actor's
commercial activities."5 Furthermore, the court recognized that the
Supreme Court and other circuit courts have yet to decide the
question of the interrelationship between the commercial activity
exception and the exemptions to the noncommercial torts excep-
section 1605(a)(5) (B) must be construed to include claims of 'trade libel.' ...
[F]oreign sovereign immunity is expressly retained in section 1605(a)(5)(B) for
claims of 'interference with contract rights' as well as for libel claims.. . . [C]ontract
rights cases will almost always involve commercial activity, and it would have been
odd for Congress... to have retained immunity for such claims only in the unusual
situation in which entirely non-commercial activity was involved.
Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1522 n.4.
47 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1472.
48 Id.; see, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 710 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that the plaintiffs' claims for fraud and interference with business relation [s]
are not subject to immunity because they "fall squarely within ... the commercial activity
exception"). Export Group 54 F.3d at 1472.
49 Id. at 1473.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1474; see Gregorian v. Izvestia, 658 F. Supp. 1224, 1234-35 (C.D. Cal. 1987),
aFd. in part, rev'd, in part, 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1989).
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tion.5 Thus, the court concluded that other courts have not found
section 1605(a) (5)(B) to provide "across-the board" immunity from
torts, like the ones complained of by the Export Group, that can be
classified as "commercial" in nature.3
The court then considered the legislative history of the Act to aid
in its interpretation of the statutory language. The court first
recognized Congress' intention in promoting the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity; namely, that "the sovereignty of foreign states
should be 'restricted' to cases involving acts of a foreign state which
are sovereign ... in nature, as opposed to acts which are either
commercial in nature or those that private persons usually perform."
54
The court then reasoned that it must be Congress' intention that
courts interpret the plain language of section 1605(a)(2) as not
restricted by other clauses that establish separate and alternative
exceptions to sovereign immunity applicable to actions of foreign
governments performed in a noncommercial capacity.5 Finally, the
court concluded that the House Report, in its "Section-by-Section
Analysis" of the Act, explicitly indicated that "Congress intended the
'commercial activity exception' to encompass those tort claims from
which foreign states acting as sovereigns are immune under section
1605(a) (5) (B)."56 Thus, the court reversed the district court's order
setting aside the default judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with its opinion. 7
III. The History of Sovereign Immunity and the FSIA
The House Committee on the Judiciary defined sovereign
immunity as "a doctrine of international law under which domestic
courts, in appropriate cases, relinquish jurisdiction over a foreign
52 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1474. But see Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 795
(2d Cir. 1984) (construing statutory language of two clauses and finding that "[t] his language
suggests that the commercial activity exception to jurisdictional immunity under (2) and the
tort exception under (5) are mutually exclusive"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985);
Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 759 F. Supp. 855, 859 (D.D.C. 1991)
(stating that "the clear language of the statute declares that section 1605(a) (5) does not apply
to section 1605(a) (2)").
59 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1475.
54 Id. Codification of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity is one of the
principal objectives of the FSIA. See House Report, supra note 39, at 6605. The theory was
first adopted by the United States in 1952. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor
to the Dept. of State, to the Acting Attorney General Perlman, 26 Dep't. St. Bull. 984 (May
1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter].
55 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1476.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1477. The court instructed the district court, on remand, to examine
INMECAFE's motion for relief from judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (3). The
district court had expressly reserved a ruling on this motion, and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals expressed no opinion on the merits of this claim. Id. at 1477 n.12.
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state. s58 However, prior to the enactment of the FSIA in 1976, the
idea of sovereign immunity was more of a diplomatic concept than a
judicial one.59 The doctrine upheld the principle of "perfect equality
and absolute independence of sovereigns."6 The doctrine developed
in the interests of international comity and the promotion of relations
among nations. From its beginnings to the present day, sovereign
immunity has passed through three distinct stages in American
jurisprudence: the early principle of "absolute immunity,"62 the
adoption of the restrictive theory of immunity by the State Department,
and the codification of the restrictive theory of immunity in the FSIA.
A. The Early Days of Sovereign Immunity
The origins of the American doctrine of sovereign immunity are
somewhat unclear. Some scholars trace it to medieval domestic
doctrines of "the King can do no wrong" and "the sovereign cannot be
a defendant in its own courts."63 "Others trace [the doctrine] to
Roman legal concepts such as 'equals do not have jurisdiction of [sic]
each other.'""
"Initially, [American] courts interpreted sovereign immunity to
furnish absolute immunity to a foreign sovereign regardless [of the
nature] of its activities."65 This idea was first recognized in the
landmark case, The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.66 In that case,
"Chief Justice Marshall upheld a plea of immunity, supported by an
executive branch recommendation, by noting that a recognition of
immunity was supported by the law and practice of nations."6 7
In the early part of this century, courts began to place less
emphasis on Marshall's notion of immunity being supported by the law
and practices of nations, and instead relied on the practices, policies
and recommendations of the State Department.68 The will of the
executive branch ultimately determined whether courts granted
58 House Report, supra note 39, at 6606.
59 Matthew P. McGuire, Note, Direct Effect Jurisdiction in the 90's: Weltover, Inc. v.
Republic of Argentina and a Broad Intepretation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
17 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 383, 389 (1992).
60 The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
61 Id. at 136.
62 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
63 Comment, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976-Judicial Predominance, 4 BROOKLYN
J. INT'L LAw 146, 147 (1977).
64 See also Havkin, supra note 2, at 455 n.1.
65 Havkin, supra note 2, at 458.
66 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
67 11 U.S. at 137; House Report, supra note 39, at 6606.
68 See Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that for 160 years the courts
have granted sovereign immunity without review when requested to do so by the executive
branch); see also Kimberly D. Reed, Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity-Foreign Sovereigns are
Immune From Claims of Libel Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Even if the Allegedy Libelous
Statements Were Printed in Connection With a Commercial Activity, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 251 (1987).
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sovereign immunity because courts were "reluctant to exercise
jurisdiction over an area that had traditionally been the province of the
executive." 69 Consequently, "foreign nations usually asked the State
Department to intervene in the judicial process,"7 ° and by the 1940s,
the Supreme Court mandated judicial deference to such requests.7'
In subsequent years, the courts became increasingly disturbed with
the principle of absolute sovereign immunity. The application of the
principle specifically "deprived private citizens conducting business
with foreign governments of a legal remedy in any court."72 Further-
more, the Supreme Court began to recognize that "granting absolute
immunity to sovereigns [had the effect of giving] foreign nations a
commercial advantage" in the global market over private firms.7"
These concerns and inequities led to the development and adoption
by the State Department of a new theory of immunity: the restrictive
theory.
B. The Restrictive Theory of Immunity
The increased participation of governments in commercial
activities after World War II prompted the State Department in 1952,
to announce its acceptance of the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity.74  This announcement, contained in the "Tate Letter,"75
accorded foreign sovereigns immunity for claims resulting' from
sovereign or public acts, but refused immunity for claims arising from
private or commercial activities.76
In practice, however, litigation of the issue of sovereign immunity was
not always confined to the directives of the Tate Letter policy.77
Unfortunately, the Tate Letter posed a number of difficulties.
Until 1976, foreign states still had the option of seeking the State
Department's support for their assertion of sovereign immunity, and
the courts regularly deferred to the executive branch's recommenda-
tion. In addition, the State Department occasionally yielded to
69 Reed, supra note 68, at 253.
70 McGuire, supra note 59, at 389.
71 See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30 (1945).
72 Havkin, supra note 2, at 459.
73 Id.
74 Reed, supra note 68, at 252.
75 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
76 Alfred Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 703 (1976); see also House Report,
supra note 39, at 6607.
77 House Report, supra note 39, at 6607. Although the Tate Letter may have
represented a willingness on the part of the State Department to adopt a more judicial
approach to evaluating immunity claims, the practical reality of the matter was that the State
Department was a political body administering ajudicial doctrine. McGuire, supra note 61,
at 389.
78 House Report, supra note 39, at 6607.
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diplomatic and political pressure from foreign states and recommend-
ed immunity where, under the restrictive principle, immunity should
have been denied.79 Thus, inconsistent application of the policies
announced in the Tate Letter had the effect of confusing judges and
litigants dealing with the issue of sovereign immunity. Judges were
usually forced to rely upon a variety of inconsistent State Department.
recommendations,8 0 which were often "contingent upon the identity
and power of the sovereign defendant.""' Private litigants were faced
with an equally difficult situation because they could never be certain,
that their legal disputes with a foreign state would be decided on the
basis of legal considerations and not through the "foreign
government's intercession with the State Department."82 Further-
more, there was no published case law to guide them in challenging
a State Department recommendation, because the State Department
generally did not specify its rationale for reaching a decision .81 It was
this state of affairs that eventually led to the enactment of the FSIA in
1976.
C. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
which codified the restrictive theory of immunity and vested the
judiciary with the authority over immunity decisions to "depoliticize"
the process."4 Congress' stated goals in enacting the FSIA were: (a)
to codify the principle of restrictive sovereign immunity; (b) to ensure
that sovereign immunity decisions were judicial rather than executive;
(c) to provide a method for service of process on foreign state
defendants; and, (d) to establish a method for satisfying in personam
judgments.85
The FSIA began with the presumption that the foreign state was
immune from suit in United. States courts 6 but allowed for exceptions
to this immunity.8 7 The most important and widely used exception
79 Case Digest, Gibbons v. Udarasna Gaeltachta and the IDA ofIreland, 10 BROOKLYNJ.
INT'L L. 255, 261 (1984).
80 Id.; see also Reed, supra note 68, at 252.
81 Havkin, supra note 2, at 461.
82 House Report, supra note 39, at 6607.
83 Havkin, supra note 2, at 462. Furthermore, "no appellate review process was available
within the State Department or the judiciary to give parties recourse once immunity had been
granted." Id.
84 House Report, supra note 39, at 6606; Reed, supra note 68, at 252.
85 House Report, supra note 39, at 6605-06; see also Havkin, supra note 2, at 462.
86 House Report, supra note 39, at 6616.
87 See 28 U.S.C. §§1605(a)(2) & (a)(5) (1976). Since this Note concerns only two of
the exceptions to immunity, the commercial activity exception and the noncommercial torts
exception, the other FSIA exceptions will not be discussed. These exceptions include:
explicit or implicit waiver of immunity, §1605(a)(1); actions concerning property in the
United States, §1605(a) (3), (4); and actions involving suits in admiralty brought to enforce
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to immunity is the commercial activity exception, at section 1605 (a) (2)
of the Act."8 The FSIA defined "commercial activity" as "either a
regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act." 9 It also required that the inquiry into the
commercial character of an activity focus on the "nature" of the
activity, rather than its purpose." Indeed, the issue of whether an
activity is "commercial" for purposes of section 1605(a) (2) has been
extensively litigated since the FSIA's enactment.91
In addition to providing jurisdiction for "commercial activities"
cases, the FSIA provides for jurisdiction in cases involving noncommer-
cial torts which occurred in the United States and were caused by the
tortious conduct of the foreign state or its officials or employees.
92
Congress stated that this "noncommercial torts exception," section
1605(a) (5), was to apply to "all tort actions for money damages, not
otherwise encompassed by section 1605(a) (2) relating to commercial
activities."93 Congress further explained in the legislative history of
the Act that the commercial activity exception and the noncommercial
torts exception were to be construed by the courts as "mutually
exclusive" of one another.94 Additionally, Congress enumerated
certain exemptions to the noncommercial torts exception for which
immunity would be reinstated, including libel, slander and interference
with contract rights.95
D. Judicial Interpretations of the FSIA
The case law surrounding the interpretation of the FSIA and its
exceptions to immunity is confusing and vague. Workable legal
standards and definitions that might add certainty to the vague
language of the FSIA have not yet been developed by the courts.96
In order to understand the law with respect to the FSIA's exceptions
to immunity, it is helpful to examine the judicial treatment of three
issues:
a maritime lien based upon a commercial activity of the sovereign state, §1605(b). See 28
U.S.C. § 1605 (1976).
8 See supra note 46.
89 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
90 Id. The courts have a great deal of latitude in determining what is a commercial
activity for the purposes of the exception to immunity. House Report, supra note 41, at 6615.
91 See infra notes 97-116 and accompanying text.
92 See supra note 35; see also House Report, supra note 39, at 6619 (explaining that
although section 1605 (a) (5) is directed primarily at the problem of traffic accidents, it is cast
in general terms as applying to all tort actions not encompassed by section 1602(a) (2)).
93 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976).
94 House Report, supra note 39, at 6619.
95 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B) (1976). This Note will not discuss the discretionary
function exemption to the noncommercial torts exception, but this exemption is listed at 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (1976).
9 Havkin, supra note 2, at 482.
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(1) What constitutes a "commercial activity" sufficient to subject
a foreign state to jurisdiction in our courts;
(2) What kind of tortious activity is covered by the noncommer-
cial torts exception;
(3) What is the proper relationship between the commercial
activity exception and the noncommercial torts exception, particularly
with respect to the exemption listed at section 1605(a) (5) (B) of the
FSIA.97
1. The Courts and the Commercial Activity Exception
The issue of whether a type of activity falls under the commercial
activity exception has been thoroughly litigated. Because Congress left
the task of interpreting many of the Act's terms to the courts, the
commercial activity exception and its terms have been subject to
varying interpretations and inconsistent application.98 Even Congress'
attempts to clarify the term "commercial activity" in the legislative
history of the Act have not been precise enough to stem the tide of
contradictory and confusing opinions by the judiciary.9 9
Fortunately, the Supreme Court recently addressed the issue. In
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,"° Justice Scalia, writing for
a unanimous Court, explained "commercial activity," for purposes of
the FSIA exception, as follows:
[W]e conclude that when a foreign government acts, not as regulator of
a market, but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign
sovereign's actions are "commercial" within the meaning of the FSIA.
Moreover, because the Act provides that the commercial character of an
act is to be determined by reference to its "nature" rather than its
"purpose," the question is not whether the foreign government is acting
with a profit motive or instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely
sovereign objectives. Rather, the issue is whether the particular actions
that the foreign state performs (whatever the motive behind them) are
the type of actions by which a private party engages in "trade and traffic
97 Export Group v. Reef Industries, Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1995).
98 For example, ownership of an apartment building by the German government was
considered a commercial activity in County Board of Arlington County v. Government of the
German Democratic Republic, No. 78-293-A (E.D. Va. 1978). In contrast, alleged libel has
been treated as a governmental rather than a commercial act when the publisher is a
government newspaper. See Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
99 The House Report states the following with respect to the definition:
The courts would have a great deal of latitude in determining what is a "commercial
activity" for purposes of this bill.... [A] ctivities such as a foreign government's sale
of a service or a product, its leasing of property, its borrowing of money, its
employment or engagement of laborers, clerical staff or public relations or market-
ing agents, or its investment in a security of an American corporation, would be
among those included within the definition.
House Report, supra note 39, at 6615.
100 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
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or commerce."'
01
The specific issue in Weltover was whether the issuance of certain
bonds by the Argentine government to private investors was a
commercial activity when the government's purpose for the plan was
to stabilize its currency.10 In holding that the issuance of the bonds
was a commercial activity, the Court pointed to the fact that the
government bonds "are in almost all respects garden-variety debt
instruments: they may be held by private parties; they are negotiable
and may be traded on the international market ... and they promise.
a future stream of cash income." 0 The Court also dismissed the
sovereign's argument that its bonds differ from ordinary debt
instruments in that its bonds were created to address a national
economic crisis, because "unless 'we can inquire into the purposes of
such acts, we cannot determine their nature.'"' ° The Court took the
view that the sovereign's argument was squarely foreclosed by the
language of the FSIA, which commanded the courts to separate the
"nature" of a sovereign's act from its "purpose.""0 5
Other courts have attempted to explain the scope of the commer-
cial activity exception with little success. In Texas Trading & Milling
Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,1 06 the Second Circuit held that
Nigeria's contracting with the plaintiff to buy cement was a commercial
activity within the meaning of the FSIA.10 7 The court rejected the
Nigerian government's argument that the planned use of the cement,
to build army barracks and roads, was governmental in nature and thus
entitled it to sovereign immunity."0
The Second Circuit was again faced with the question of whether
a certain act by an instrumentality of a foreign sovereign was commer-
cial in nature in Letelier v. Republic of Chile. ° In Letelier, the plaintiff
sought execution against the assets of the Chilean national airline,
LAN, for its involvement in the assassination of the Chilean Ambassa-
dor to the United States in Washington, D.C. 10 The airline argued
that it was immune from suit because the transport of the assassin from
Washington to Chile constituted governmental action, not private
101 Id. at 614 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICrIoNARY 270 (6th ed. 1990)).
102 Id. at 609.
103 Id. at 615.
104 Id. at 616 (quoting De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1393
(5th Cir. 1985)). The plaintiff had relied on De Sanchez for the view that the "essence of an
act is defined by its purpose." De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1393.
105 Wedover, 504 U.S. at 616.
106 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
107 Id. at 310.
108 Id. at 309.
109 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1984).
110 The complaint alleged, among other things, that LAN was party to the conspiracy to
assassinate the Ambassador. Id. at 791-92.
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action.' The court held the commercial activity exception inappli-
cable to the specific conduct of LAN because "politically motivated
assassinations are not traditionally the function of private individuals
[T]hey can scarcely be considered commercial activity."" 2 In
defining the term "commercial activity," the court noted that the
"inquiry must be focused on whether the specific acts are those that
private persons normally perform."
ns
Several years after the decision of the Second Circuit in Letelier,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with the opportunity
to define the scope of the commercial activity exception in Gregorian
v. Izvestia."' In that case, the plaintiffs argued that subject-matter
jurisdiction over their libel claim was conferred by the commercial
activity exception to foreign sovereign immunity because the Soviet
newspaper's article was published, sold and distributed in the United
States and abroad, causing the plaintiffs great financial loss. 115 The
court disagreed with the plaintiffs and held that the publication of the
article was governmental in nature." 6 The court further noted that
"Izvestia is the voice of an official Soviet agency, and the determination
of its contents can-be carried out only by a governmental entity; thus,
publishing a particular article in izvestia is a sovereign, governmental
function.""
7
2. Courts and the Noncommercial Torts Exception
"The courts' interpretations of the language and the provisions of
[the noncommercial torts] exception, as with the commercial activity
exception, have not been uniform.""' Although the Act does
provide that the noncommercial torts exception will cover neither
commercial torts subject to the commercial activity exception nor the
exempted torts of section 1605(a) (5) (B), the language of the statute
is "so broad that it provides little guidance to the courts to determine
what specific torts are covered."" 9
The noncommercial torts exception has not been litigated very
frequently. Most of the litigation has focused on whether the language
of the exception required the tortious conduct to occur in the United
"' Id. at 796.
112 Id. at 797.
11 Id.; see also Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d
300, 309 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
114 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1989).
"5 Id. at 1521.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1522 (quoting Statement of Interest of the United States at 24).
118 Havkin, supra note 2, at 472.
119 Id.
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States. For example, in McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2 ' the
Ninth Circuit adopted a narrow interpretation of the "situs of the tort"
provision, holding that tortious acts which occurred at a United States
embassy did not fall within the noncommercial torts exception
requirement of a "tort occurring in the United States."'
In 1984, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals122 once again was
presented with the opportunity to clarify the noncommercial torts
exception. In Olsen v. Government of Mexico, 23 the court held that the
plaintiffs allegation of negligent piloting of an aircraft by a Mexican
government employee, which occurred in the United States, was
sufficient to bring the case within the noncommercial torts excep-
tion. 124 The court concluded by noting that "[t]he claims asserted
by appellants fall within the exception to immunity for noncommercial
torts as provided by section 1605 (a) (5) of the FSIA. Additionally, the
conduct of Mexican personnel which may have led to the crash
occurred at the operational level and was not discretionary."125
Finally, in De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua,12' the Fifth
Circuit identified another tort that was not encompassed by the
noncommercial torts exception. In De Sanchez, the plaintiff claimed
that a Nicaraguan bank's failure to honor a check it had issued to her
constituted conversion.2 7 The court ruled that "although nominally
within the ambit of the exception, [it] is not the type of tort claim that
the exception intended to cover." 2' Because the court found the
conversion claim to be a claim for unjust taking of property covered
by section 1605 (a) (3),29 the cause of action could not be main-
tained under the noncommercial torts exception. 30
120 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1983).
121 Id. at 589.
122 Significantly, Judge Nelson, who wrote the opinion in this case, also decided the
Export Group opinion. In both cases, he found subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claim.
123 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 917 (1984).
124 Id. at 646.
125 Id. at 648. The court discusses the "discretionary function" exemption of
1605(a) (5) (A) at great length, finally concluding that the section, which restores immunity
to the sovereign acting at the discretionary level of decision-making, did not apply. Id.
126 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
127 Id. at 1389.
128 Id. at 1398.
12 Section 1605(a)(3) provides, in relevant part: "(a) A foreign state shall not be
immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case..
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue ....
28 U.S.C. §1605(a) (3) (1976).
130 De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1398.
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3. The Courts and the Relationship Between 1605(a)(2) &
(a)(5)
Very few courts have attempted to reconcile the conflicting
language of the two exceptions to immunity at issue in Export Group:
the commercial activity exception and the noncommercial torts
exception. Some courts have, however, stated their opinion that the
provisions in sections 1605(a) (2) and (a) (5) should be construed as
"mutually exclusive."'"' Some courts also have indicated that if a
plaintiff argued that a sovereign's activity fit within the requirements
of both the noncommercial tort and commercial activity exceptions, it
would likely find that the sovereign's activity fit neither exception. 32
The only circuit court to pursue the issue of whether section
1605(a) (5) (B) restored immunity to commercial torts was the Ninth
Circuit in Gregorian v. Izvestia.133 There the court held that the
commercial activity exception did not apply to the actions of the Soviet
newspaper in publishing an allegedly libelous article. 3 4  In other
words, the court found that the activity was not a commercial tort,
subject to the commercial activity exception. Nevertheless, in a
controversial footnote, the court recognized that "the bar against 'libel'
claims contained in section 1605(a) (5) (B) must be construed to
include claims of trade libel."' 3' The court then went on to suggest
that it would be nonsensical for Congress to have retained immunity
for claims like interference of contract and libel "only in the unusual
situation in which entirely non-commercial activity was involved.'
36
Thus, the suggestion of the court in Gregorian was that Congress
intended for section 1605 (a) (5) (B) to deny jurisdiction over commer-
cial tort claims that would otherwise be properly heard by the courts
under the commercial activity exception.3 7
The viewpoint expressed in the Gregorian footnote has not been
accepted by many district courts. For example, in Yessin-Volpin v.
Novosti Press Agency,'8 a federal district court sitting in New York held
that the commercial activity and the noncommercial tort exception
131 See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1125 (1984).
132 See generally De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.
1985); In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
'33 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1989).
134 See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text.
135 Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1522 n.4.
I36 Id. (emphasis added).
'37 Id.
138 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (statements by Soviet newspapers allegedly causing
harm in the United States were not of a commercial nature simply because the publishing
entity was engaged in other commercial activities).
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should be construed sequentially."9 In an opinion contrary to
Gregorian, the court acknowledged that the libel exception might
preclude jurisdiction over a foreign state acting in a noncommercial
capacity, but would not operate to deny jurisdiction if the activity were
"trade libel," a commercially tortious activity. 14°
The relationship between the two exceptions was at issue again in
United Euram v. U.S.S.R..' The federal district court held that the
cultural exchange of musicians between the two parties was a commer-
cial activity subjecting the USSR to suit in American courts. 4  The
defendant sovereign argued, however, that even if this were true, the
plaintiff's claim of interference with contract rights would be barred by
section 1605(a) (5) (B) of the FSIA, which expressly restores immunity
from claims involving interference with contract rights.4 4 The court
rejected this argument entirely, stating that the section 1605 (a) (5) (B)
exemption "was intended to cover noncommercial torts .... and the
restrictions embodied in subsection 1605(a) (5) (B) were not intended
to restrict the scope of the commercial activity exception in subsection
1605(a) (2)."'" This conclusion was, once again, in conflict with the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning in the Gregorian footnote.
VI. Analysis of the Export Group Decision
Even though the FSIA may be unclear on some points, the statute
gives the sovereign the presumption of immunity. 45  This presump-
tion, however, is subject to several exceptions. 46  Few courts have
attempted to reconcile the language of section 1605(a) (2) with that of
section 1605(a) (5) (B), waiting instead for Congress to clarify the
language.'47 The Ninth Circuit in Export Group made a good attempt
139 Id at 855; see also Reed, supra note 68, at 254.
14 Yessin-Volpin, 443 F. Supp. at 855.
141 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Pursuant to a cultural exchange agreement,
plaintiff and defendant agreed to have Soviet artists and musicians sent to the United States
and Great Britain to give performances organized by the plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff sued for
breach of contract and interference with contract rights, and defendants claimed sovereign
immunity. Id.
142 Id. at 611.
143 Id. at 612.
144 Id.
145 See House Report, supra note 39, at 6616.
146 For example, the language of section 1605(a) (5) (B) restored sovereign immunity in
cases where the activity complained of is interference with contract rights. See 28 U.S.C.
§1605 (a)(5)(B) (1976). However, it was unusual to find an instance where a sovereign had
interfered with a contract right involving only noncommercial activity. The execution and
performance of contract rights were inherently "commercial." See Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871
F.2d 1515, 1522 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, when applying the language of section
1605(a) (5), stating that "this section applies only to activities not covered under section
(a) (2)," to everyday reality, the courts are often left confused.
147 See Export Group v. Reef Industries, Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1473 (9th Cir. 1995).
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to explain the structure and language of the FSIA's exceptions.'48
The end result was an analysis of the Act consistent with the complex
law surrounding the FSIA.
A. INMECAFE's Involvement in Commercial Activity
A major flaw in the Ninth Circuit's opinion was its refusal to
discuss whether the actions of INMECAFE were "commercial activities"
as defined in section 1603(d) of the Act. The court seemed content
to assume this question away without probing the issue.'49 Of course,
this lack of discussion may have been intentional, since INMECAFE did
not contest the finding of its activities as commercial in nature. 50
Indeed, INMECAFE's only argument was that section 1605(a) (5) (B)
restored immunity to a foreign sovereign that committed any tort listed
in that section, regardless of whether it was commercial in nature.' 5'
Despite this lack of foresight by INMECAFE, the question of
whether the Ninth Circuit was correct in holding that INMECAFE's
activities were commercial still remains. In order to analyze this issue,
one must recognize that through the enactment of the FSIA, Congress
gave courts broad discretion in determining whether an activity by a
foreign sovereign was commercial in nature. 5 ' Although Congress
provided several examples of commercial activities, these examples
were provided only as guidance to the courts.' Ultimately, the
determination of whether an act was commercial in nature rests with
the courts.
In Weltover the Supreme Court also attempted to provide guidance
to the courts in their determinations of whether an act was commer-
cial. The Court, in addressing the issue, renounced the "profit motive
to the activity" test used by some courts.'54 Instead, the Court simply
reiterated Congress' focus in enacting the commercial activity
exception: the courts must look to the nature of the act and not its
148 See id. at 1473-75.
149 The court never discussed which of the three prongs of the commercial activity
exception the activities of INMECAFE met. The exception states that there are three types
of activities that have the jurisdictional nexus required to pass muster under the commercial
activities exception: (a) the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; (b) the act is performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or (c) the act is outside
the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
that is also outside of the United States, and that act causes a "direct effect" in the United
States. See 28 U.S.C. §1605(a) (2) (1976).
150 The finding that INMECAFE's activity is commercial was not contested on appeal.
See Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1467.
151 Id at 1474.
152 House Report, supra note 39, at 6615.
153 See supra note 100; see also House Report, supra note 39, at 6615.
154 "[T] he question is not whether the foreign government is acting with a profit motive
or instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives." Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992).
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purpose in determining whether it is a commercial activity by a foreign
state.'55
The Ninth Circuit in Export Group ultimately had the authority to
hold the activity of INMECAFE to be commercial. The transaction
involved was the bidding on a contract, an activity that most courts
would find to be of a commercial nature. Perhaps the court viewed
the answer to the issue as self-evident because the bidding was taking
place in the realm of international commerce and trade. 156 There-
fore, the Ninth Circuit was justified in determining that the activity of
INMECAFE, interference with a bidding contract involving internation-
al trade, was a commercial activity as defined in section 1603(d) of the
FSIA.
Concerning the specific question of whether the activity of
INMECAFE was commercial, there is one issue that never arose in
Export Group but was present in previous cases. Unlike the defendants
in Weltover and De Sanchez, INMECAFE did not claim that the purpose
of the activity was governmental in nature. 57 In Weltover, the defen-
dant sovereign explained that the necessity of the activity, issuing the
bonds to private investors, arose from the fact that Argentina needed
to stabilize its currency.' In De Sanchez, the Nicaraguan bank
asserted a similar position, that the activity it was engaged in was
governmental because the purpose of the activity was to improve the
nation's economy.5 9  However, INMECAFE's failure to argue this
point should not be deemed detrimental to its claim. It is unlikely,
given the instructions of Congress in section 1603(d)," ° that
INMECAFE could have prevailed had it argued that it had a govern-
mental purpose in interfering with the bidding contract and that such
purpose should be considered in determining whether its activity is
commercial in nature.
B. The Central Issue: The Ninth Circuit's Reconciliation of Sections
1605(a)(2) and (a)(5)(B)
1. The Gregorian Footnote as Binding Precedent
Before addressing the issue of whether section 1605(a) (5) (B)
restores immunity to commercial torts, the Ninth Circuit was obligated
to address the controversial footnote found in its opinion in Gregorian
155 See supra note 37.
156 See Export Group v. Reef Industries, Inc., 54 F.3d 1466 (9th Cir. 1995).
157 Id. at 1467-69.
158 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
159 The specific argument was that Banco Central did not enter the marketplace as a
commercial actor, nor did it earn any fee by issuing the check to Mrs. Sanchez. De Sanchez
v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir. 1985).
160 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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v. Izvestia. 6' INMECAFE argued that this footnote constituted an
alternative ground for the court's decision,16 but the Ninth Circuit
held otherwise. The court cast this footnote aside as dictum, stating
Gregorian held that there was no applicable exception to sovereign
immunity under the FSIA for Gregorian's libel claim because Izvestia's
activities were not commercial activities as defined by section 1605(a) (2).
The footnote suggests that Gregorian's "trade libel" claim would fare no
better because, given the court's holding that Izvestia's actions were not
"commercial activities" as defined in section 1605(a) (2), the alleged tort
of trade libel would be encompassed within the libel exception of
1605 (a) (5) (B). The statement in the footnote, that "it is far more likely"
that Congress intended section 1605(a) (5) (B) to apply to all claims of
libel, is therefore dictum, as it is offered only to explain why section
1605 (a) (5) (B) would encompass the "trade libel" claim if plaintiffs had
attempted to rely upon that section to establish jurisdiction.'6 3
The Ninth Circuit was justified in disregarding the Gregorian
footnote. The central issue contended in Gregorian was whether the
commercial activity exception applied to the activities of the defen-
dant."  The court held that it did not apply, but then decided to
discuss section 1605(a)(5) in the controversial footnote."s The
entire discussion in the footnote contained issues and suppositions
which go beyond the facts presented to the court. In other words,
because the discussion was not necessary to the court's decision in the
contested matter before it, the discussion must be characterized as
non-binding dictum.'66
2. The Reconciliation of the Two Excptions
The Ninth Circuit then attempted to interpret the language of the
FSIA. First, the court stated that the "clear statutory language of
section 1605(a)(5) indicate[s] that both this exception and the
restrictions upon this exception are intended to apply only to torts 'not
otherwise encompassed in [section 1602(a) (2)].,1,167 Several courts
have held this language to mean that the two exceptions are mutually
exclusive of one another. In fact, only the district court in Grego-
rian has ruled to the contrary: that foreign states and their agents are
161 For discussion of this footnote, see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
162 Export Group v. Reef Industries, Inc., 54 F.Sd 1466, 1471 (9th Cir. 1995).
163 Id. at 1472 (citations omitted).
164 See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 48.
166 Dictum is defined as "expressions in the court's opinion which go beyond the
contested facts before the court". BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY, 454 (6th ed. 1990).
167 Export Group v. Reef Industries, Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1473 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing
Joseph v. Office of Consulate General of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988)).
168 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.168
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immune from claims for torts listed in section 1605(a) (5) (B) when
those claims arise from the foreign actor's commercial activities. 169
The legislative history of the FSIA clearly indicates that Congress
intended for section 1605(a) (5) (B) to apply only to noncommercial
torts. The comments state that the subsection applies to "all tort
actions for money damages, not otherwise encompassed by section
1605(a) (2) relating to commercial activities." 7 ' This language
indicates that any tort encompassed by section 1605 (a) (2) never enters
into the purview of section 1605(a)(5) or its restrictions. The court
ruled in accordance with the legislative history of the Act.
One argument advanced by the court in support of its ruling was
that the section 1605 (a) (5) (B) exemption manifested Congress' intent
to enumerate any exemptions from statutory coverage it viewed as
necessary.' 7' Once Congress demonstrated this intention, established
canons of statutory construction state that "generally exceptions are not
to then be implied."17 2 In other words, there is a presumption that
Congress did not enumerate specific exemptions in section 1605 (a) (5)
but leaves the exemptions in another section of the same statute to
judicial interpretation. 7 ' Therefore, the exemption in section
1605(a) (5) (B) should be considered only as a limitation upon the
matter that directly precedes it, namely section 1605(a)(5), the
noncommercial torts exception. 74
Finally, although the exact question presented to the Ninth Circuit
has not been answered, by the Supreme Court or any other circuit
court,'75 two district courts have attempted to reconcile the commer-
cial activity exception with the exemption found in section
1605(a) (5) (B). In Yessin-Volpin, a federal district court held that
"commercial" libel would fall within the scope of the commercial
activity exception and that section 1605(a) (5) (B) would not apply to
restore immunity.'76 This holding, however, was merely dictum since
the sovereign's activity was held to be noncommercial in nature. 177
The case most factually similar to Export Group is United Euram v.
U.S.S.R' 78 Like Export Group, this case involved a claim of interfer-
169 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1474.
170 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
171 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1473; see also Reed, supra note 68, at 255.171
172 NORMANJ. SINGER, 2A SUrHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 47.11 (5th ed. 1992) (stating that
only if a contrary intent or meaning is clearly indicated will [an exception] operate as a
general limitation on all provisions of the act).
'73 Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1474.
174 Id. at 1473.
175 Id. at 1474.
176 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
177 See Reed, supra note 68, at 254.
178 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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ence with contract rights. 9 The court held that the activity engaged
in by the foreign defendant constituted a commercial activity.'
Significantly, the court then ruled that the restrictions embodied in
section 1605 (a) (5) (B) did not operate to restore immunity to a foreign
sovereign engaged in commercial activity.8'a Thus, all the relevant
case law on the language of the exceptions, sections 1605(a) (2) and
(a) (5), seems to support the holding of the Ninth Circuit in Export
Group.
There are also significant policy reasons for refusing to blur the
distinction between commercial activities and the noncommercial
activities exception. Mixing the two exceptions might have the effect
of frustrating private citizens who wished to engage in'commercial
activities with a foreign state but could not be sure whether a court
would have jurisdiction to hear any disputes that might arise. 18
Furthermore, mixing the two exceptions essentially would make the
commercial activity exception a red herring, which, in turn, would run
counter to the policy behind the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, as stated by the Supreme Court:
[Slubjecting foreign governments to the rule of law in their commercial
dealings presents a much smaller risk of affronting their sovereignty than
would an attempt to pass on the legality of their governmental acts. In
their commercial capacities, foreign governments do not exercise powers
peculiar to sovereigns. Instead, they exercise only those powers that can
also be exercised by private citizens. Subjecting them in connection with
such acts to the same rules of law that apply to private citizens is unlikely
to touch very sharply on "national nerves."'
If the commercial activity exception had been gutted by the Ninth
Circuit in Export Group, there is little doubt that the policies behind the
FSIA would not have been served.
V. Conclusion
The above analysis indicates clearly that the Ninth Circuit decided
Export Group correctly. Its use of legislative history and established
canons of statutory construction enabled the court to effectively
reconcile the language of the FSIA exceptions to immunity. Whether
one agrees with the final decision or not, the court had a tremendous
amount of discretion, granted by Congress, to decide the scope of the
commercial activity exception with respect to the facts of the case. It
is obvious from the discussion in the opinion that the court did not
179 In United Euram, the U.S.S.R. breached its agreement to provide musicians and artists
as part of an agreement to feature them in America and Great Britain. See supra note 142
and accompanying text.
180 United Euram v. U.S.S.R., 461 F. Supp. 609, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
181 Id.
182 Reed, supra note 68, at 256.
183 Alfred Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 703-04 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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abuse this discretion but instead used reason, precedent and logic to
decide whether to apply the commercial activity exception to the suit
against INMECAFE.
It is now the responsibility of the Supreme Court to reconcile the
Ninth Circuit's decision with the controversial footnote in Gregorian
that seeks to expand the scope of section 1605(a) (5) (B) of the FSIA.
It seems very unlikely that the Court will overturn the decision of the
Ninth Circuit in Export Group, especially since many of the members of
the current Court are literalists with respect to statutory construc-
tion.1"' If the Supreme Court examines the issues presented in Export
Group, however, there may be far-reaching international effects. The
decision of the court in Export Group is a statement that the United
States will hear claims based on commercial torts of foreign sovereigns.
Because of the interrelations between international actors with respect
to global commerce, the frequency of claims involving these types of
torts will continue to rise. The effect of the Export Group decision will
be a long-term increase in litigation in our country involving foreign
sovereign actors. This increase, unfortunately, could be a source of
tension between the United States and other nations.
BENJAMIN ERIC LOVELL
184 ConsiderJustice Scalia's opinion in Weltover, which was unanimously followed by the
Court. The opinion is concerned with interpreting section 1603(d), the definition of
"commercial activity," in a strict, literal way. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
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